

00695

1962/10/24

~~R D~~
~~PIAS~~
~~DS~~
~~338~~
~~7/1~~

~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
 RELEASE SENSITIVE
 EXCISE DENY
 DELETE Non-Responsive
FOIA Exemptions
PA Exemptions

3 Date: 4/8/92
CLASSIFY as TS authority to:
() DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C OADR

October 24, 1962

TO : The Secretary
THROUGH: S/S
FROM : EUR - Mr. Tyler
S/P - Mr. Rostow
MEA - Mr. Talbot
SUBJECT: Cuba

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

REVIEWED by JHR DATE 5/9/82
() RELEASE () DECLASSIFY
() EXCISE () DECLASSIFY in PART
() DENY () Non-responsive info.
FOI, EO or PA exemptions (b)(1); (b)(5)
CLASSIFY as _____, OADR
() DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C, OADR

1. This memorandum proposes a course of action designed both to remove Soviet MREM's from Cuba and to draw constructive advantage from the Cuban crisis in prosecuting our own positive purposes in Europe.

2. An essential ingredient of any course of action designed to remove MREM's from Cuba is a clear US intent to remove them by force, within some realistic time frame, if they are not otherwise disposed of. Only against this background is there any chance that steps to offer the Soviets a face-saving out might have the intended effect.

3. If US firmness is manifest, and there is considered to be a need for additional steps to ease the path of retreat for the Soviets, the course of action outlined below might have some advantages:

(a) Current NATO discussions of the multilateral force would be handled in such a way as to give the Germans, Italians, Belgians, Canadians, Turks and any other NATO countries which favor the force a full opportunity to make their positive attitudes evident. The US would then repeat its statements both that it is willing to take part in such a force, if several other NATO countries wish to go forward, and that US Polaris submarines and other external forces will meet NATO military needs in the meantime.

(b)

(b) We would privately urge the Turkish and Italian governments then to announce unilaterally that they intended to remove land-based IRBM's from their territory as soon as it was clear that a multilateral sea-based force would eventually replace them, especially in view of US interim Polaris coverage in the meantime.

(c) We would propose to the USSR that MRBM's now be removed from Cuba and that the US and USSR enter into exchange of declarations that they would desist from deploying MRBM's to the Caribbean. At the same time the US might issue a separate declaration, taking note of the Italian and Turkish governments' stated policies and indicating its intent to respect them.

(d) US and Soviet declarations regarding non-diffusion might be exchanged for good measure.

4. It would be essential that any action regarding Turkey and Italy avoid several dangers:

(a) We should not be in the position of pressing these countries to remove IRBM's against their will. This means that they would have to be offered an adequate substitute. These governments want a weapon in whose ownership, manning, and control they can actively participate. The Jupiter is such a system; the US Polaris submarine is not. They would, therefore, only regard the Polaris as an adequate replacement on an interim basis, if they expected to proceed from there to either national MRBM forces or a multilateral force.

(b) We should not negotiate with the USSR about any MRBM's other than those in Cuba. The USSR may be influenced in respect of Cuban MRBM's by Italian and Turkish statements about their IRBM's, but these statements are not the subject of the negotiation.

(c) We should make clear that it is essential the Soviet MRBM's be removed immediately. We should not recognize any relation between this timing and that of any Turkish and Italian action, which might be delayed until these

governments

- 3 -

governments could get more specific assurance of a multi-lateral force coming about than it will be possible to offer them in the next few weeks. The Turkish and Italian statements are background for the Soviet action, not a quid pro quo.

(d) It should be made clear that the US would not permit basing of Soviet sea-based MIRV's (e.g., in submarines), any more than of land-based MIRV's, in Cuba. (Our Polaris submarines in European waters are based in Scotland and will eventually be based in Spain.)